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Social movement unionism has become the new buzzword for both the academic left and union 
reformers. As Ian Robinson noted, “… analysts and activists have begun applying the concept to 
organized labor in the United States, as a characterization of some unions within the larger 
movement, as an ideal towards which organized labor ought to be moving if it wishes to 
recapture lost economic and political power, or both”.1 However, whether social movement 
unionism is something new is open to serious doubt. This article gives a chronological overview 
of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) and whether it can be 
classified as a social movement union. Kim Moody stated that a current of social movement 
unionism was “… already at hand in unions such as … the United Electrical Workers in the US”, 
although he did not elaborate on this statement.2 Thus, this article seeks to determine whether 
Moody’s claim is correct. This article is divided into two main sections; in the first section, I 
argue that the UE’s polices and practices match the key components of Moody’s account of 
social movement unionism. However, in the second section by analysing the ideological conflict 
within the UE, union raids and government harassment of it, and in recent times, its campaign to 
keep Stewart-Warner’s Chicago plant open, I conclude that that social movement unionism alone 
will revive US unionism. 
 
Social Movement Unionism 
There are many different theories of social movement unionism, but unquestionably, Moody’s 
account is the most popular. Social movement unionism became prominent as an approach in the 
US with publication of Moody’s book Workers in a Lean World. Indeed, Workers in a Lean 
World was the catalyst for other US labor academics and writers embracing social movement 
unionism. Since the book’s release, there has been a plethora of publications arguing that social 
movement unionism can lead to the revitalisation of North American unions, with most either 
referencing Moody or using a very similar account of social movement unionism to his.3 Indeed, 
other theorists of social movement unionism recognise the influence of Moody’s account of 




social movement unionism. Peter Waterman acknowledges that Moody’s interpretation of social 
movement unionism is ‘more-influential’ than his own. Rob Lambert and Eddie Webster state 
that the “… notion of a global social movement unionism was introduced by Kim Moody in … 
Workers in a Lean World”; while Kim Scipes notes that Moody “… was the first to popularize 
SMU [social movement unionism] in North America”.4 
 
There are five crucial aspects of Moody’s account of social movement unionism: (1) union 
democracy/extensive rank-and-file involvement; (2) undertaking to organise the unorganised; (3) 
fighting for everything that affects working people in their communities and having alliances 
with the local community; (4) labor internationalism; (5) undertaking independent political 
action. In addition, while not a crucial aspect of his account, Moody noted that women and/or 
people of color have greatly contributed in transforming and revitalising unions. Based on these 
criteria, I shall demonstrate that the UE matches the key components of Moody’s account. 
 
The UE: The Early Years 
The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, more commonly known as the 
United Electrical Workers, is a small union with approximately 35,000 members. The UE is an 
independent union, as it has not been affiliated with the American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO) since it left/was expelled from the CIO in 1949. The 
United Electrical and Radio Workers of America came into existence during the 1930s. US labor 
historian Ronald Schatz noted that 
 
Local union leaders … formed a series of coalitions in an attempt to unify the 
burgeoning union movement in electrical manufacturing and ancillary industries. 
These efforts resulted in the formation of the United Electrical and Radio Workers of 
America [in March 1936]. As the full name of the organization indicated, the UE was 
a product of an alliance between two distinct groups of peoples or union locals. 
Some came from electrical factories … others from radio and home appliance 
shops… The UE membership at this time amounted to but 15,000 of the 300,000 
workers in the industry.5 




By November 1936, the UE had joined the newly formed CIO. The UE expanded dramatically 
the following year, partially because of James Matles. While not the President, Matles ‘… 
exercised effective control’ of the Machine, Tool and Foundry Workers union as he was the only 
full-time official. The union merged with the AFL affiliated International Association of 
Machinists (IAM) in 1935 as Matles hoped that the merger would result in an ‘AFL industrial 
charter in electrical manufacturing’. However, almost immediately Matles became disillusioned 
with the union. Amongst Matles’ concerns were the AFL’s refusal to grant the union ‘… an 
industrial charter’, the union’s refusal to allow African Americans to become members, and its 
hostility to, amongst others, Communists, radicals and Jews. After “… he received 
encouragement from the Communist Party to leave the IAM and join the newly formed UE … 
Matles resigned and took fourteen lodges with him [approximately 15,000 workers]. His old 
group of Machine, Tool and Foundry Workers came with him, as did most of the new shops he 
had organized”.6 The UE responded to this gesture by changing its name to the United, 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. Matles was also elected as the director of 
organisation; a nation-level position7 
 
Since its formation, the UE has been a democratic union with the rank-and-file playing a crucial 
role; this clearly corresponds to Moody’s account of social movement unionism. Filippelli and 
McColloch stated that 
 
[f]rom the beginning, the UE’s structure provided for broad participation by the 
membership. Each year the international union and each district met in their 
representative conventions. The UE’s constitution ensured strong district and local 
autonomy. District officers received their salaries from the district, not the 
international, and the general executive board could not remove district presidents 
from office… International representatives were appointed by the general executive 
board with “due deference given to the wishes of the membership of the district,” but 
they were paid by the District. [Moreover,] Local, district, and national officers stood 
for election annually.8 
UE Locals adopted their own constitutions which outline ‘… the rights and duties of the 
membership, how the Local will be governed, and how the local activities will be governed’. The 
only constraint is that the Local constitution cannot contradict the ‘National constitution, 




especially in the areas of union democracy, finances, and the right of all workers to belong to a 
union’. This is to ensure that all workers, regardless of, amongst other things, race, sex, and 
political beliefs, could belong to the union and to deprive give bosses of ‘… yet another tool with 
which they can divide workers’.9 The UE’s constitution allows the rank-and-file to vote on all 
key issues, including contract proposals. The members also elect delegates to the National 
Convention and District Councils.10 There are seven UE District Councils, which cover the entire 
US geographically. The District Councils are funded by UE locals through a monthly per capita 
payment, and meet either two or three times a year to discuss issues affecting the UE and set 
policy. The District Councils ‘… elect District Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Secretary Treasurers, 
Executive Boards, and District Trustees to one-year terms’. Any UE member of good standing is 
eligible for election.11  
 
The annual National Convention is the ‘… highest decision-making body in the UE’. It is 
comprised of delegates ‘… elected by members of their local unions, plus two delegates from 
each District Council’.12 The delegates set UE policy for the forthcoming year, with all Locals 
and District Councils able to submit policy resolutions. The National Convention elects the UE’s 
National Officers (General President, Secretary-Treasurer, Director of Organisation) and three 
Trustees (they audit the ‘UE’s books and records four times a year and safeguard the property of 
the National Union’). As with positions on the District Councils, any UE member of good 
standing is eligible to stand for these positions.13 Unlike the majority of unions worldwide, the 
UE Constitution states that the three National Officers ‘… shall be paid a salary not to exceed 
the highest weekly wage in the industry’. In other words, the National Officers do not receive a 
wage much higher than the rank-and-file.14 The National Officers, UE District Presidents and 
District Secretaries comprise the General Executive Board which meets three times a year. They 
deal with all issues and carry ‘… out the policies and programs of the union between the 
National Conventions’. The National Officers also oversee the UE’s organisational work, 
collective bargaining, political action, education and publicity, and international solidarity, 
which are the five crucial areas of UE activity.15 
 
The UE had many major successes in the middle-to-late 1930s. After a long-struggle, the UE 
organised the GE Schenectady plant, and within four months of this triumph, GE agreed to the 
UE’s request for a national contract, which led to 29 new UE Locals at GE plants. Likewise, 




after a years-long struggle and following a NLRB ruling that Westinghouse ‘… was violating the 
legal responsibility to bargain’, Westinghouse agreed to a national contract with the UE in 1941 
covering 19 plants.16 UE membership grew from less than 50,000 in 1939 to 432,000 during the 
middle of World War II (WWII) and to 750,000 members by war’s end.17 The improvement in 
the US economy helped the union’s efforts to organise workers.18 Moreover, it was the UE’s 
belief in the benefits of organising the unorganised and its rank-and-file unionism that 
contributed to the remarkable gains in membership. The Report of the General Officers to the 8th 
UE Convention in 1942 argued that the UE should organise the unorganised.19 Likewise, at the 
1946 CIO convention, UE Director of Organising James Matles stated that 
 
[a]ll men are created equal – and we propose to fight for that principle… And if we 
continue to organize this movement of ours on that principle, then the overwhelming 
majority of the unorganized workers will rally to us. They will join us. And our ranks 
will be tremendously increased.20 
The only unions which achieved growth compared with the UE’s during the war years were the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) (165,000 to 1 million), and the United Steel Workers of America 
(USWA) (its membership increased three-fold to 700,000).21 In 1946, the UE was successful in 
84.1 per cent of NLRB certification elections, which was the highest rate for any US union. That 
year the CIO organised 350,000 workers, with 20 per cent organised by the UE.22 The UE 
organised the unorganised, thus it had another crucial characteristic of Moody’s account of social 
movement unionism. 
 
As it organised thousands of new members the UE then built links with the local community; 
another important aspect of Moody’s account of social movement unionism. For example, in St. 
Louis during the 1930s and 1940s the UE Local President, William Senter (who admitted that he 
was a member of the Communist Party), claimed that while the UE was interested in the 
livelihood of its members, it was also ‘… interested in the effects of their economic status on our 
community’.23 In other words, where workers received higher wages, it was likely that the local 
community would be vibrant. The UE Locals’ belief in the benefit of labor-community alliances 
helped in a campaign to prevent the Emerson Electrical Company moving its production plant 
from St Louis in late 1939-early 1940. The UE’s campaign was eventually successful, but at the 
cost of agreeing to cooperate with management. Nevertheless, the UE’s campaign led it to 




become a respected organisation in the community. This helped the Local during a five-month 
strike at Century Electric in 1940, which led to a good settlement.24 Likewise, during WWII, the 
Local hosted a convention involving UE members, business representatives and ‘… prominent 
figures in St. Louis public life’ that debated the course industrial relations should take following 
the end of the war.25  
 
The UE opposed prevailing opinion during the late 1940s. In the 1948 Presidential campaign, the 
CIO Executive Board endorsed the Democrat candidate Harry S. Truman and instructed its 
member unions to do likewise. However, the UE claimed that ‘… as an autonomous organization 
it would make its own political determinations’. Eventually, the UE endorsed no candidate, but 
the National Officers endorsed Henry Wallace who belonged to a new US political Party: the 
Progressive Party. Moreover, Wallace spoke at the 1947 UE Convention and UE President 
Albert Fitzgerald was named as permanent chairman of the Progressive Party convention.26 The 
UE’s support and endorsement of a third US political party occurred before the Communist Party 
of the USA endorsed the Progressive Party.27  
 
The UE has a relatively good record in its treatment of so-called minorities and adopting issues 
affecting them. From its inception until WWII, women only had a minor role in the UE. This 
was mainly because women only comprised 14 per cent of the UE’s membership in the lead-up 
to the war. Historian Lisa Kannenberg asserted that “… while some exceptional women did take 
active, leadership roles in the early organizing, the UE leadership was predominantly male and 
women’s issues had no discernable place on the UE agenda”.28 With US involvement in WW II, 
women comprised almost 50 per cent of electrical workers, compared to one-third before the war 
(not all women employed in the electrical industry were represented by the UE). With their 
increased presence in the electrical industry, the UE placed greater emphasis on its women 
members. It conducted women’s leadership classes and it led the fight for demands affecting 
women, and had success in a number of instances. For example, 
 
[b]y 1944 UE contracts covering 460,000 workers contained equal pay clauses, and 
in 1945 UE got a War Labor Board order requiring General Electric, where 40 
percent of the workers were women, and Westinghouse, to cease pay discrimination 
based on sex. In addition, among the 1,843 labor dispute cases involving UE before 




the regional war labor boards, the union won numerous contract improvements 
outside of the wage area. These included shift differential premiums, improved 
vacation plans, job classifications and automatic progression.29 
By the end of the war, there were over 260,000 UE women members. This corresponded to 40 
per cent of the UE’s membership.30 However, the leadership was still male-dominated (see 
below). While the UE’s record on women was good, its record on African-American issues for 
the period 1930-1960, despite its claims, was weaker. One delegate at the 1942 UE convention 
noted that the 
 
UE’s record on racial discrimination has been second to none. Unfortunately, much 
of this record … has remained on paper. Very little has been done to effectuate the 
fine resolutions that have been passed by every convention of the UE on this 
question.31 
 It is often claimed that the main reason that African-Americans did not make large strides within 
the union during WWII was that African-American comprised only five per cent of the UE’s 
membership at the end of the war. Thus, African-American issues were not deemed very 
important.32 However, in a study of CIO unions, Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin 
convincingly argue that the relative sise of the African-American membership barely made a 
difference to the union’s policies towards them.33 Instead, they suggested that the UE did not 
have as a good record on African-American issues as it did on gender issues because it was 
fighting tooth-and-nail for women’s issues, and was not able to “… engage in a conflict on a 
second frond, that is, fighting against employers who … were even more resistant to hiring 
blacks than employers in other mass-production industries”.34  
 
It is difficult to ascertain the truth. Nevertheless, conditions for UE African-American members 
often varied from Local to Local. For example, UE Local 601, which represented workers at ‘… 
the flagship of the Westinghouse chain’; hired an African-American woman to work in its office. 
However, white UE members pressured the union to fire her. The UE Local’s full-time officer 
claimed “… it was terrible. It was just terrible. We had to dismiss her. It wasn’t a question of 
[her ability to perform] a job. She was black and therefore she had no right to work in a union 
office”.35 Likewise, at the UE Local at the ‘Philco plant in Philadelphia, an enduring pattern of 




racial segregation and discrimination existed for many years’. This Local was led by the UE’s 
right-wing and was one of the first Locals to secede from the UE and join the IUE, where its 
racism continued unabated.36 However, not all UE Locals were racist. For example, UE Local 
1225 in New York pressed companies to hire minorities including African-Americans. Likewise, 
UE Districts in the New York-New Jersey and St. Louis areas were very active in African-
American issues, partly because of the high number of African-Americans working in the 
electrical industry in their districts. At the same time, ‘Communist[s] were leaders in these 
districts and being politically conscious of social issues, pressed the black question’.37 Moreover, 
the UE led the fight for no-discrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements. In 1950, 
GE agreed to a no-discrimination clause. However, during the 1950s, Westinghouse refused to 
adopt such a clause. As the UE noted, ‘[i]n spite of wide public support our campaign received 
in 1958, Westinghouse continued its opposition. Congressmen and Senators, as well as 
outstanding Negro and white Civil Rights leaders, supported our campaign, but no other union in 
the industry took up the cause’.38 Finally, in 1963 Westinghouse agreed to the clause. The UE 
claimed: 
 
… we are gratified that we have finally won it, not only for the plants we represent, 
but for all Westinghouse plants. Because UE has scored this breakthrough, the no-
discrimination clause can now be included in all union contracts with Westinghouse. 
The clause prohibits discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, or national 
origin.39 
While the UE has a relatively good history regarding minority groups, as it does with union 
democracy, collective bargaining is an area that the UE’s record is superb. For example, during 
WWII, the US government regulated wages. Between 1940 and 1945, wages “… were not 
permitted to increase by more than 15 percent … [but,] … over the same period the cost of living 
went up by 45 percent”.40 Hence, following the war, workers wanted a dramatic increase in their 
wages. The Big Three CIO unions (UE, UAW, USWA) demanded substantial increases, with the 
UE seeking a $2 per day increase (25 cents per hour); a 24 per cent increase. The UE had 
overwhelming support from its workers at GE, General Motors (GM), and Westinghouse to 
strike if the companies did not meet its demands.41 In a precursor to the upcoming strike, in 
September Westinghouse briefly locked out 36,000 workers who were demanding wage 
increases from its East Pittsburgh, Lima, Cleveland, and Sharon plants.42 GE and GM offered the 




UE a ten cents an hour increase which was promptly rejected. GM offered 13½ cents an hour in 
December 1945, which the UE also rejected. UE members at GE, GM and Westinghouse 
overwhelmingly voted for strike action if the parties could not reach an agreement.43 As there 
was no settlement before the strike deadline, in January 1946, some 200,000 UE workers went 
on strike at GE, GM and Westinghouse, with the UAW on strike at GM, and 800,000 
steelworkers striking a week later. ‘Labor had effectively, for the first time, closed down the 
heart of America’s industrial might’.44 As Schatz noted, the “1946 strikes were the first national 
strikes in the electrical manufacturing industry and the first major strikes GE and Westinghouse 
had known since 1918”.45 
 
On February 12, the UE negotiated an 18½-cent an hour wage increase for its GM workforce. As 
the UAW sought a 19½-cent an hour increase at GM, it condemned the UE for selling out. 
However, in January, the UAW had agreed to an 18-cent and an 18½ -cent increase from Ford 
and Chrysler respectively. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the UE ‘sold out’ as the UAW 
already had agreed to the same amount with the other two big automakers. A month later, the UE 
also achieved an 18½-cent increase for its GE workforce. Two months after that, through what 
the UE called ‘… the magnificent courage and union solidarity displayed by 75,000 
Westinghouse workers … [the UE] won a tremendous victory for Westinghouse workers’. The 
company, after initially refusing ‘to make any wage offer’ and then only offering approximately 
a 9-cent an hour increase, finally agreed to a 19-cent increase.46 GE’s insistence that while men 
would receive an 18½-cent increase, women should only receive 15 cents complicated the UE’s 
negotiations with the company.47 UE Secretary-Treasurer James Matles noted that GE 
 
[s]aid we’ll improve our offer but we will not give the bobby-soxers [GE’s name for 
women] the same as we give the men… So the fight then was for equality in the 
settlement in cents per hour. So we stayed out another four weeks. Then [in the final 
settlement] it was eighteen and a half cents across the board for everyone in the 
plants including the bobby-soxers.48 
Likewise, in the UE’s settlement with Westinghouse, the 19-cent an hour increase included ‘… a 
fund of one cent per hour per worker, to be applied to the equalization of women’s rates’. The 
GM settlement included ‘… an 80-cent minimum hiring rate for both men and women in the 
auto giant’s electrical division’.49 All the strikes were a success for the UE. While it did not 




achieve its initial demand of a $2 a day increase, it achieved substantial pay rises for both male 
and female members and was a step towards equal pay. The UE’s record in consistently winning 
pro-labor contracts matches its success in organising workers. Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin in their 
comprehensive study of CIO unions’ contracts with employers from 1938 to 1955 argue that the 
UE contracts were more pro-labor than other unions.50 For example, they concluded that 
 
[a]n examination of the local agreements of each of these Big 3 Internationals [UE, 
UAW, USWA] reveals that those won by UE Locals were more systematically pro-
labor … than were the UAW’s; the USWA was a distant third in pro-labor 
provisions. The same pattern appears in these unions’ national contracts… [T]he 
agreements between UE and General Electric over the years were consistently pro-
labor; those between UAW and General Motors less so; and those between the 
USWA and Carnegie-Illinois (which became US Steel in late 1950) were the least 
pro-labor.51 
They noted that “… not one of the UE/GE national contracts … ceded management rights or 
prerogatives”.52 
 
It is clear from the above that the UE matches the key components of Moody’s account of social 
movement unionism. It was democratic with extensive rank-and-file involvement, it organise the 
unorganised, and it fought for everything that affects working people in their communities and 
had alliances with the local community. Following the 1946 mass strike against GE, GM and 
Westinghouse, the ideological conflict within the union, and government oppression led to a 
dramatic decline in the UE. I do not intend to provide a detailed analysis of this period, but an 
overview is necessary to illustrate the relative powerlessness of a union in the face of a campaign 
by the government, employers and other unions to weaken or destroy it. 
 
The Decline of the UE 
Rival unions, businesses and the US government alleged many UE leaders were Communists or 
had links with the Communist Party. Ideological conflict had always raged within the UE 
between left-wing and right-wing factions. However, the end of WWII and the beginning of the 
Cold War brought this conflict to a head. Within the UE, a right-wing opposition caucus – UE 




Members for Democratic Action (UEMDA) – formed in August 1946. It claimed that ‘… the 
choice of the [UE] membership lies between (1) returning the UE to the ranks of respectable CIO 
unions with sound union objectives, or (2) allowing the UE to hurry along its own destruction as 
a front for the American Communist Party and its program. There is no middle road’.53 Aiding 
the UEMDA was the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). It campaigned against 
communist influence in trade unions and was a very vocal critic of the UE. For example, a 
member of the ACTU transferred funds from CIO President Phillip Murray to forces within the 
UE’s right wing. Moreover, the 1947 CIO convention passed an anti-Communist resolution. The 
resolution rejected political parties (namely the Communist Party’s attempts to interfere with the 
CIO. Following this resolution, the UEMDA won control of six Locals in the eastern United 
States.54  
 
Further aiding the right-wingers in the union was the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, passed by the 
US Congress in 1947. The UE argued that the Taft-Hartley Act ‘… seeks to accomplish the 
domination or destruction of the American labor movement… [I]t will be used by Big Business 
as a club over the heads of workers – a club to reduce wages, increase speed-up and rate cutting 
and eliminate hard-won wage gains in working conditions’.55 A key clause in the Act was union 
officials had to sign an affidavit declaring that they were not communists. Not surprisingly, the 
UE General Executive Board refused to comply with the Act.56 At the UE’s national conventions 
in 1946, 1947 and 1948, the UEMDA attempted to pass right-wing resolutions and elect right-
wing candidates to the UE’s national office. They were defeated, but the right wing continued to 
gain strength.57 As a testament to its democratic roots, union democracy, however, was one area 
where the UEMDA rarely criticised the UE. Indeed, despite the ideological conflict within the 
UE, “… virtually no charges of electoral improprieties were raised against the incumbents” at 
the Local, District, and National level.58  
 
Union raids also hurt the UE. Despite some opposition from the UEMDA – it disapproved of the 
raids because it wanted to change the UE from within (although the UE alleged that the UEMDA 
aided the UAW’s attempt to raid UE Locals) – ‘… between the passage of Taft-Hartley in the 
summer of 1947 and the withdrawal of UE from the CIO in the fall of 1949, rival unions 
conducted more than 500 raids on UE Locals’. Among the unions which conducted raids were 
the UAW, IAM, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the International 




Brotherhood of Teamsters, the AFL Jewelry Workers, the Glass, Ceramic and Silica Union and 
the AFL Carpenters.59 In an attempt to stop the raids, UE leaders decided to sign the anti-
Communist affidavits as required by the Taft-Hartley Act.60 The factional battle within the UE 
reached a climax at its convention in September 1949. The right-wing delegates believed that 
they had enough support to defeat the Executive Board. However, a UE News editorial before 
the election refuted the UEMDA’s claim that the only way it would lose was if the left-wing 
faction rigged the election. At the convention, the Board won re-election in a closely fought race. 
The right-wing forces refused to accept the result as they claimed that the election was fixed (this 
was a rare instance of the right-wing claiming that UE elections were rigged). As Filippelli and 
McColloch argued, it is difficult to determine whether this was true, but it was likely there were 
voting ‘irregularities’ on both sides. Moreover, the US government barred entry to the country to 
81 delegates from 26 Canadian UE Locals because the government claimed they were 
Communists.61 At the convention, the left-wing faction noted that it had received telegrams from 
every one of these Locals signed by every one of the delegates stating that if they (the delegates) 
were present at the convention they would have ‘… supported the UE constitution and policies 
and they would have voted for [the incumbents] Albert Fitzgerald for President, [Secretary 
Treasurer Julius] Emspak for Secretary, Matles for Director of Organization’.62  
 
Following the convention, the UEMDA called for secession from UE. This finally happened at 
the CIO convention in November 1949. At the convention, the CIO expelled the UE. However, 
the UE had effectively withdrawn from the CIO before the convention as it withheld ‘… per 
capita [dues] from the CIO “until such time as the CIO returns to the principles of free, 
democratic industrial unionism”’.63 The UE boycotted the convention after the CIO refused to 
guarantee that CIO unions would not conduct any more raids on UE Locals. It is important to 
note that the UE’s withdraw from the CIO was contrary to the Communist Party of the USA’s 
(CPUSA) position for all ‘red’ CIO unions.64 This further demonstrates that the UE did not just 
blindly follow CPUSA’s policy. The CIO convention witnessed the formation of a new union: 
the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE).65 The IUE almost 
immediately conducted raids on UE plants. The IUE was very successful because of red-baiting 
and with the CIO, spent over $5.5 million on its campaign to destroy the UE. By the end of 
1950, the UE had lost 152,000 members and was the minority union at GE and Westinghouse.66 
By 1952, the UE had 215,000 members compared to the IUE’s 231,000 members. Filippelli and 




McColloch argued that the greater the seniority of UE members the greater the likelihood they 
would remain with the UE or switch to the IUE. Women and African-Americans were generally 
split evenly on the issue. The main factor that determined the IUE’s ability to raid a UE plant 
was its capacity to win over the Local union leadership. If the leadership defected to the IUE, the 
IUE usually defeated the UE.67 
 
During this period, the UE sustained a massive anti-Communist attack by the US government. In 
addition to the anti-Communist clause in the Taft-Hartley Act, the Atomic Energy Commission 
ordered all companies not to “… recognize unions that were labelled as security risks; the UE 
thereby lost its bargaining rights at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in Schenectady, New 
York”.68 The US government scheduled House Committee of Un-American Activities sessions at 
the same time as union representation election were planned. It forced UE leaders and members 
to testify about their alleged CPUSA links, while local newspapers reported on the ‘Red UE’.69 
The UE did not accept the red-baiting campaign without a fight. It argued that McCarthyism was 
Hitlerism, as it was “… an attack on the freedom of religion, the freedom of belief, the freedom 
of speech … [and] the freedom of people to freely associate together”. Moreover, at a US 
government ‘executive session’, Matles told McCarthy that “… when you accuse me of spying, 
and when you accuse decent working people [in UE organized plants] in Lynn and Schenectady 
of spying and sabotage, you are lying, Senator McCarthy. You are a liar”.70 Nevertheless, the 
UE’s membership declined rapidly due to the attacks by the US government and the raids by 
rival unions: by 1954 membership was only 164,000.71 In comparison, the IUE’s membership 
increased to over 300,000. The UE, however, managed to survive these actions and membership 
was starting to stabilise in the mid-1950s. 
 
Women’s issues remained an important part of the UE’s programme, in part, because of the anti-
Communist attacks on the UE. The UE held a national conference on the problems of working 
women. In an attempt to counter rival unions’ raids on its membership, the UE leadership paid 
particular attention to the needs of its Locals, in which women were a significant portion of the 
membership. Further, because of its weakened power, the UE concentrated its bargaining 
strategy at the “… local level, where women were more likely to play an active role”.72 
Moreover, the UE argued that discrimination against women favored business. It claimed that 




companies discriminated against women ‘… because it pays off to the bosses in billion of dollars 
in extra profits’. For example: 
 
According to the US 1952 census the average wage for women in factories was 
$1,468 a year less then men (men averaged $3,615, women $2,147). This difference 
of $1,468 when multiplied by the 4,182,000 women employed in factories that year 
makes the staggering total of 6.1 billion dollars. There’s the answer – in one year US 
corporations made six billion one hundred million dollars in extra profits from their 
exploitation of women.73 
While UE membership was starting to stabilise, in part because of its focus on its Locals, it was 
to suffer a crippling blow in 1955. The CPUSA issued a directive to its ‘union cadres’ to join 
unions within the newly merged AFL-CIO. This led to the UE losing half its membership. Many 
UE Local leaders, who were either CPUSA members or supporters, persuaded their Local to 
certify an AFL-CIO union as the bargaining agent. For example, ‘[f]our UE district presidents 
and thirty staff members and local union business agents announced that the UE was “finished,” 
proclaimed it time to find a “haven in the ‘mainstream’, and … prevailed on their members to 
secede from the UE”. However, the haven that the leaders sought often turned out to be not quite 
as they imagined, as many were expelled from the union that they joined.74 
 
UE membership declined to 75,000 in 1957, and it fell even further to 58,000 in 1960, while the 
IUE’s hovered around 300,000.75 Arguably, this action by the CPUSA’s ‘union cadres’ 
demonstrated the true influence of the CPUSA on the UE. While the UE’s trade union 
performance cannot be questioned, it is likely, as the UE’s policy on WWII demonstrated that 
CPUSA members or supporters strongly influenced its political positions. It is equally likely that 
CPUSA influence on the UE dramatically declined after the exodus as its members and 
supporters transferred to AFL-CIO unions. However, as the managing editor of UE News Peter 
Gilmore noted, there were CPUSA members and cadre who stayed loyal to the UE. Having 
survived the McCarthy hearings and the persecution of the UE, usually at great personal cost, 
they did not want the Communist Party or any other organisation telling them to which union 
they should belong.76 The number of CPUSA members within the UE is open to question. While 
some UE leaders such as William Sentner, James MacLeish (‘president of District 4 in New 
York’), David Davis (‘business agent for Local 155 in Philadelphia’), and Nat Cohen (‘executive 




board member of Local 474’) admitted belonging to the CPUSA, other UE leaders such as 
Secretary Treasurer Julius Emspak and Director of Organisation James Matles continually 
denied belonging to the party.77 However, it is important to note that recent research by historians 
with access to the Kremlin’s files ‘… have not found a single Communist who was active in the 
leadership of a CIO union, at any level, whom they could even insinuate to have acted in any 
way to endanger “national security”’.78 Attacks by the US government, raids by rival unions, and 
the CPUSA’s betrayal more than devastated the UE: between August 1945 and 1960, the UE lost 
almost 700,000 members, although the membership losses suffered by the UE were partly 
because of the decline in the arms industry. The UE managed, however, to survive, and 
continued to achieve good collective bargaining agreements for its members. Indeed, at 
Westinghouse in the 1950s, the UE achieved better contracts for its members than the IUE did.79 
 
1960-Present 
During this time, there was an increase in rank-and-file revolts and militancy in general. For 
example, in 1970 there were 66 million days lost because of strikes: the third highest on record. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the birth of such rank-and-file reform movements as 
the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement, Miners for Democracy within the United Mine 
Workers of America, and Teamsters for a Decent Contract. Teamsters for a Decent Contract 
eventually led to the formation of one of the most successful rank-and-file reform movements, 
Teamsters for a Democratic Union within the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. For the 
UE, however, it was a period of stagnation. In the mid to late 1960s, the UE “… experienced its 
biggest organizational surge since the 1940s… Some shops lost earlier in the decade were won 
back”, with other organising victories across the US.80 This was because there were fewer anti-
Communists attacks on the union by the US government, companies and rival unions. In 1969, 
the factional war within the electronic industry was partly healed as the IUE agreed to cooperate 
with the UE in the forthcoming GE and Westinghouse negotiations. This was in part because of 
the UE’s and IUE’s continued failure in negotiations with the companies.81 In the 1969 
negotiations, GE tried to remove long-standing agreements, such as the right of unions to bargain 
national contracts. Following a deadlock in negotiations, GE workers went out on strike (16,000 
UE members were on strike out of a total workforce 170,000). This was the first time since 1946 
that the entire GE workforce struck together. The unions had support from community groups, 
politicians, and students. A UE Local leader summed up the UE’s position: 





[General Electric have] been trying to tell … [the workers] … there are three 
separate groups in GE: the company, the employees, and the union. That’s what 
they’ve based themselves on. We have to show them they’re wrong. The UE 
represents the workers. The workers are the union. We have to show them there are 
not three groups but just two: the company and the union. Them and Us.82 
 
The strike was successful. GE agreed to withdraw its demands for an end to national contracts. 
Workers received wage increases, and “… improvements in pensions, sick pay, vacations, 
hospitalization, weekly sickness and accident benefits, life insurance, and non-hospital medical 
expenses”.83 The UE argued that the success of the strike was partially because of the support it 
received from the Teamsters, UAW and the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 
Union. Moreover, a ‘… key factor in the success of the strike was the unity of the UE and IUE at 
the negotiating tables, a unity which was strengthened and continually reinforced by the 
determination of the rank and file of both unions to cast aside anything which interfered with 
winning the fight’.84 This strike was arguably, the UE’s last great triumph. As the success against 
GE occurred at the end of 1969, there was renewed hope for the decade to follow. However, the 
downturn in the US economy severely hampered the UE. Despite some organising victories, UE 
membership continued to decline and by 1975 stood at 67,000.85 
 
After the betrayal of the CPUSA, the UE was more independent politically; a key characteristic 
of Moody’s account of social movement unionism. The UE was actively involved in the civil 
rights movement. It condemned the jailing of Martin Luther King. It ‘… sent an exceptionally 
large delegation to the 1963 March on Washington [it was one of the sponsoring organizations], 
and the union pushed hard for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act’.86 UE President Albert 
Fitzgerald claimed that the Act was ‘… the most crucial piece of legislation now pending, 
perhaps the most important bill of the past ten years, we must take special measures to mobilize 
our membership to insure its passage’.87 Likewise, the UE condemned the Vietnam War. A 
resolution adopted at the 1966 UE Convention argued that many men, including UE members, 
were fighting and dying 9000 miles away from home. The resolution gave an anti-capitalist tone 
to the UE’s opposition to the war. It noted that in the US, the “… cost of living has been rising 




rapidly, taxes have been going up and the fight against poverty is being sacrificed, while 
corporations are wallowing in the greatest profits in history”.88 
 
In the current era of globalisation, the UE strongly opposes neoliberalism and free trade. It 
argues that they are ‘… further examples of imperialistic policies that exploit peoples around the 
world for the benefit of Local elites and Western consumers… The economic exploitation of the 
mass of human beings for the benefit of a few is not inevitable’. The 2001 UE Convention noted 
the UE ‘… actively supports organizations that are attempting to create an alternative 
globalization based on a worldwide fellowship and not on the continued exploitation of one 
segment of the world’s population for the benefit of another’.89 The UE’s stance on such issues 
as civil rights and the Vietnam War and its independence from the Democratic Party (unlike the 
majority of US unions), clearly demonstrate that the UE in recent years undertakes independent 
political action. 
 
However, since 1970 the UE’s history is one of ‘treading water’. For example, the 1970s was 
such an uneventful period for the UE that in their authoritative history of the UE, Filippelli and 
McColloch devote less than 10 pages to the UE’s activities in the 1970s. The 1980s and 1990s 
were a bittersweet period for the UE. The union largely resisted concessions in collective 
bargaining agreements, and led the fight against plant closings, but its membership halved (see 
below for details). This led the UE to increase its efforts to organise the unorganised. The UE 
argued that ‘… the survival of our union depends on our ability to organize’.90 In 1980, while the 
UE only had 65,000 members, it organised 5000 new workers, which as Filippelli and 
McColloch noted, was “… no small feat in the midst of one of the worst periods in the annals of 
organized labor”.91 In the period 1972-1984, the UE’s success rate in NLRB certification 
elections was 60.4 per cent, with only the American Federation of Teachers having a higher 
success rate (63.8 per cent) amongst all major unions. In comparison, in the electrical industry, 
the IBEW had a 51.2 per cent, and the IUE only had a 43.4 per cent success rate.92 Likewise, in 
1994, the UE had the best record of any US union in gaining first contracts with companies, and 
in the period 1996-98 consistently achieved wage increases above the average for all US 
unions.93  
 




The UE has had recent success in organising new members, albeit on a much smaller scale than 
in the past. In 2000, the UE organised new 1600 workers, which was the eighth consecutive year 
that the UE organised more than a thousand workers.94 While not at the level of its organising 
successes in the 1940s, and unlikely lead to a revival in the UE’s fortunes, the union’s recent 
organising efforts are noteworthy considering the size of the union. In comparison, the Canadian 
Auto Workers, which has more than seven times the membership of the UE, only organises 
approximately 6000 workers per year, which is still a good achievement in itself. The UAW has 
over 20 times the members of the UE, but only organises 13,000 new workers per year. Despite 
the UE’s recent organising efforts, membership has slumped to its current level of 35,000. The 
major contributor to the UE’s slump has been the health of the US economy, and multinationals 
moving production abroad. The US recession in the early 1980s led to thousands of UE members 
losing their jobs. Thus, by the mid-1980s, it has lost much of its influence in negotiations with 
Westinghouse, although it maintained some power at GE.95 However, the IUE suffered an 
equally dramatic decline. In 1979, the IUE had 243,000 members, but by 1993, the union’s 
membership was only 143,000.96 
 
Partly due to outsourcing, the UE is forming alliances with unions and workers worldwide and is 
at the forefront of labor internationalism in the US. As a result of the production shift to Mexico, 
UE formed an alliance with the Authentic Labor Front [Frente Autenico del Trabajo (FAT)]. 
Moody noted that this was UE’s “most active and ambitious cross-border alliance”.97 FAT is like 
the UE in that it is “… independent of political parties, business and government”, unlike other 
Mexican labor federations.98 The UE’s International Representative David Johnson noted that in 
“General Electric alone, we’ve lost over 10,000 jobs in the last few years. They’ve moved … 
[mainly] to Mexico… To put it a little simplistically, either our wages or conditions are going to 
go down to the level of Mexico, or we’re going to figure out ways to help Mexicans raise their 
wages and conditions up to our levels”.99 While there is self-interest involved in the UE’s 
commitment to international solidarity, this is not its only concern in such alliances. The UE 
argues that corporate-led globalisation would lead to a global ‘race to the bottom’, with no 
concerns for labor and the environment. It noted that there is a ‘… polarization of wealth [and] 
environmental degradation… Instead of the race to the bottom, we must pull working people 
throughout the world to the top’.100  
 




The UE provides FAT with “… financial support, research capability, and the prospect of rank 
and file action” in the US in support of Mexican organising drives.101 In return, FAT helps the 
UE in its organising drives. For example, FAT “… provided Mexican organizers, whose work 
with Mexican employees in a … virulently anti-union Milwaukee foundry was vital to the UE’s 
successful unionization drive there”.102 As part of the strategy to organise the foundry workers, 
the Mexican organiser distributed a leaflet to workers. It stated that “… the UE and the FAT 
fight for the same ideals… I feel proud to see my countrymen demanding their union rights. And 
it’s moving to see workers of all races and nationalities joining forces… Keep on, brothers and 
sisters. The way to the future is the union!”103 While the UE is at the forefront of labor 
internationalism and independent political action, it was still a male-dominated union. For 
example, in the early 1980s, there was a decided lack of women in leadership positions. In 1984, 
only one woman was on the 15-member General Executive Board. However, this changed 
dramatically in subsequent years. In 1985, three women were elected to the Board, and by 1991, 
there were six women Board members, which exceeded “… the female percentage of union 
membership”.104 Thus, while the UE does not have a perfect record on women’s issues and the 
role of women in the union, it does have a very good tradition. Likewise, while the UE’s record 
on African-Americans was far from perfect during WWII, it has improved in subsequent years. 
As previously noted, the UE condemned the jailing of Martin Luther King and was very active in 
the 1963 March on Washington, and campaigned for the “… passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act”.105 Similarly, an increasing number of UE Locals are leading the fight against racism. For 
example, UE Local 150 in North Carolina has a ‘… multiracial membership and black 
leadership’. Moreover, in 2001 the UE co-sponsored a march and rally in Raleigh State, North 
Carolina in an attempt to promote African-American and ‘Latino unity in the South’.106 
 
The UE at Stewart-Warner 
The UE has an excellent organising record; it has great success in achieving good collective 
bargaining agreements, and it is at the forefront of efforts to build international labor solidarity. 
However, the UE’s campaign to keep Stewart-Warner’s Chicago plant open in the 1980s 
demonstrates the lack of power the UE (or indeed, any union) has in comparison to business in 
poor national economic conditions. It is also an example of the decline of the industrial sector in 
the US. The IBEW was the certified bargaining agent at the Stewart-Warner Chicago plant. 
However, following worker dissatisfaction with the union, the UE eventually gained certification 




at the plant in 1980.107 In 1985, following financial difficulties at Stewart-Warner, the UE formed 
the Coalition to Keep Stewart-Warner Open (CKSWO). Amongst its members were the UE, 
other ‘… labor activists, church groups, the University of Illinois at Chicago … and aldermen 
from the Chicago city council’. In 1986, Stewart-Warner announced that it was to transfer 150 
jobs to its Johnson City plant. However, the UE demonstrated “… that in the longer term some 
twenty-five hundred jobs were at stake … [because of] … underlying weakness in the 
company’s wage and financial policies”.108 In 1987, Stewart-Warner merged with the British 
multinational British Thermoplastics and Rubber.109 Reverend Jesse Jackson urged all Chicago 
workers to help in the fight to keep Stewart-Warner in Chicago. He claimed that the reduction of 
US jobs was “… just another form of economic violence that must be ended the same way we 
ended racial violence about 20 years ago”.110 However, later that year, Stewart-Warner 
announced that in 1988 it would cut approximately a quarter of its Chicago workforce. In June 
1989, the company revealed that its Chicago plant “… may be on the endangered species list 
because high operating costs at the plant make it difficult for the firm to compete”.111 Andrew 
Jonas, a Reader in the Department of Geography at the University of Hull, noted that the 
 
… campaign to save Stewart-Warner was built around a well-organized community 
base and was linked to a wider political movement to transform economic policy in 
Chicago. In this respect, the CKSWO’s concerns and goals fed into a broader 
program of action to protect inner-city neighborhoods from manufacturing 
displacements… Opportunities to link with political movements beyond the city 
limits also came up during the course of the struggle.112 
Moreover, in an attempt to keep the plant open, Stewart-Warner workers agreed to concessions, 
which would have saved the company $2.5 million per year. Stewart-Warner’s management 
rejected the offer as inadequate.113 On November 4 1989, Stewart-Warner announced that it was 
shutting its Chicago plant “… and moving its operations to Mexico in two years”.114 However, 
the Stewart-Warners’ Chicago plant remained open to mid-1995. During this time, the UE 
managed to achieve a contract without concessions, and wage rises for the few remaining 
employees.115 But, despite alliances with the local community and politicians, the UE was unable 
to keep Stewart-Warner’s Chicago plant open. The Stewart-Warner campaign demonstrates that 
in specific circumstances the UE’s power is weak in comparison to that of business. Although 




doomed to failure, the UE’s attempt to keep Stewart-Warner open utilised labor-community 
alliances, alliances with politicians, and even offered wage concessions. 
 
The UE’s experiences at Stewart-Warner were not isolated events in the 1980s and 1990s. For 
example, in 1982 UE Local 610 defeated a concessionary contract and achieved contract gains 
following a 205-day strike at American Standard’s Westinghouse Air Brake and Union Switch 
and Signal, in which the striking workers received strong community support. However, by 
1985, and despite strong labor and community support, American Standard decided to shut the 
plant.116 There was a similar situation at Morse Cutting Tools. The UE defeated a concessionary 
contract in 1982, but management decided to close the plant in May 1987.117 However, two 
months later, and following a UE-community campaign, Morse Tools reopened amid much 
fanfare. But, there was not to be a happy ending. Morse finally closed its operations for good a 
few years later.118 Nevertheless, that the UE and community groups managed to reopen a closed 




The UE’s polices and practices correspond to the key components of Moody’s account of social 
movement unionism. The UE is highly democratic, with extensive rank-and-file involvement. It 
organises the unorganised, and with its alliance with the FAT, the UE is at the forefront of 
international labor solidarity. The UE undertakes independent political action, is hostile to 
capitalism, and has alliances with the local community. Finally, while not perfect, the UE’s 
record on minorities is above average. This demonstrates that while social movement unionism 
is being portrayed as something new it has been in existence within the US for almost 70 years. 
The UE also provides union reformers and labor academics with two key findings. 
 
First, social movement unions potentially achieve better collective bargaining agreements and 
organise more new workers per capita than right-wing unions. As noted above, the UE has a very 
good record in collective bargaining. As the study by Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin demonstrated, 
the UE’s agreements were more pro-labor than any other CIO union throughout the CIO’s 
existence as a separate labor federation. Even though it was the minority union at Westinghouse, 
the UE achieved better contracts than the IUE in the 1950s. Likewise, the UE has a very 




impressive organising record, with a very high NLRB certification election win rate. These 
findings correspond with Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin’s research.119 Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 
established that left-led unions achieved greater pro-labor contracts than center and right-wing 
unions.120 While the first finding is positive for those hoping that social movement unionism will 
revive US unionism, the second is not. The UE was unable to stave off the ideological conflict 
that raged within it. The anti-Communist attacks from within its ranks, from other unions, the 
CIO, and by the US government, and the CPUSA’s betrayal decimated the UE. As Ian Robinson 
argued, 
 
… the radical agenda of SMUs [social movement unions] means that government 
and employers often target them with higher levels of repression than rival union 
types. We have seen this dynamic recur in U.S. labor history, and the result was 
clear: SMUs were marginalized except during the great economic crises of the 
1930s. The lesson, it seems, is that even with superior mobilization capacity, SMUs 
will be crushed by the superior power resources of the state, employers, and more 
conservative unions – if they are willing and able to cooperate. Less inclusive and 
radical forms of unionism will thus come to dominate unless such a coordinated 
repressive response proves impossible.121 
It is not necessarily the case that social movement unions face greater repression than other types 
of unions (which Robinson does note). Nevertheless, in the majority of situations, especially in 
the era of neoliberal globalisation, governments and conservative unions will likely try to 
prevent any radical unions’ agenda from succeeding, especially anti-capitalist activities. As J.M. 
Barbalet argued: 
 
Every time that radical unionism has flourished in the USA, it has been destroyed or 
severely damaged by political repression. In addition, the ‘mainstream’ labor 
movement ‘came under special attack when it showed signs of becoming radical’. In 
particular, state repression had the effect of totally removing the radical element 
form the labor movement, and of providing a strong incentive away from the radical 
end of the political and industrial organizational spectrum.122 




Nevertheless, that the UE has managed to survive is testament to the success of the UE’s brand 
of trade unionism. Indeed the UE managed to survive the IUE as a stand-alone union. IUE’s 
membership continued to decline throughout the 1990s. By 2000, its membership had slumped 
to 113,000.123 In the same year, the IUE merged with the Communications Workers of America 
in 2000. As Filippelli and McColloch argued in relation to collective bargaining, “[p]erhaps the 
best testimonial to UE’s trade union performance lies in the fact that throughout the civil war in 
the union, the right wing never raised a telling criticism in this sphere”.124 The UE, despite its 
faults, is one of the great examples of the benefits of rank-and-file unionism, or to use another 
term, Moody’s social movement unionism. The UE, while not being a perfect example of a 
social movement union, is the best example of a social movement union in the US. However, its 
dramatic decline from its heyday due to ideological conflict, government repression and attacks 
from employers demonstrates that social movement unionism alone will not lead to the revival of 
the US union movement.  
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